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Abstract
Alluding to theories about relative economic status and behavior, this paper studies if
relative income mobility, or the intergenerational change in income positions, affects
interpersonal trust. Empirically, the question is brought down to an application with US
General Social Survey data. For the identification of a causal relationship, I use a
structural approach and estimate a recursive bivariate probit that controls for selection
on unobservables. Results suggest that trust increases if children have achieved an
upward income movement away from their parents’ income position, and it decreases
with the experience of downward income mobility. Policy implications are also
discussed.
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1 Introduction
Over the last few decades, trust within societies, known also as interpersonal or social
trust, has turned out worthy of increasing attention from both public policy makers
and social scientists. Arrow (1974) defines trust as a social lubricant to cooperation
and economic exchange, and Putnam (1993) considers it a fundamental building block
of social capital. More specifically, Stiglitz (2000) and Millo and Pasini (2010) suggest
that interpersonal trust alleviates moral hazard and incentive problems. Empirical evi-
dence confirms the economic theories by finding associations of trust, for example, with
investment and transcation costs (Zak and Knack 2002), large organizations’ performance
(La Porta et al. 1997), and ultimately—by revealing a causal relationship of trust with
growth (Algan and Cahuc 2010).
Motivated by the above findings, this paper falls into a branch of the economics litera-
ture interested in the factors that influence trust. Regarding determinants at the individual
level, Alesina and La Ferrara (2002) find that trust is lower for blacks, women, people
with traumatic experience, and those who live in societies with ethnic, race and eco-
nomic heterogeneity. Zak and Knack (2002) study trust as an outcome of formal/informal
institutions, while Aghion et al. (2010) find a negative effect of market regulation on
trust. Income inequality is another factor for which previous studies have consistently
uncovered an effect on trust. The higher the gap between rich and poor in a society, the
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lower the level of interpersonal trust on both cross-country (Zak and Knack 2001) and
cross-community dimensions (Alesina and La Ferrara 2002).
Related literature has implied the interconnection between income mobility and sense
of fairness by discussing mobility’s relationship with inequality. Solon (2002) suggests
that intergenerational income mobility could involve intergenerational transmission of
inequality. In the majority of country-level studies, high income mobility is comple-
mented with low cross-section inequality (Gottschalk and Smeeding 1997; Freeman and
Katz 1995; and Aaberge et al. 2002 – cited in Solon 2002). Gottschalk (1997) argues that
the trend toward greater inequality is to be reduced only if mobility increases. Under a
standard approach that assumes all inequalities as unfair, translating the stylized facts on
mobility and inequality to mobility and fairness bolsters the speculation that more fair-
ness could be attained also with higher mobility. That said, social trust could be affected
by changes in income mobility, and not only by changes in income inequality.
Under a structural approach, controlling for selection on unobservables, this paper
aims to uncover a causal relationship between relative intergenerational income mobil-
ity and present-day interpersonal trust. The intuition behind is that through changing
perceptions of fairness about others and the system, income mobility would affect inter-
personal trust. This underlying hypothesis has previously been evidenced in the work of
Fischer and Torgler (2006), drawing attention to “envy,” a concept that differently from
perceptions of fairness has a negative connotation, and showing that people’s positional
concerns about their relative income correlate negatively with their generalized trust. The
authors relate the focus of their study to early origins of economics in moral philosophy–
for example, the phenomenon of relative wants is central to human behavior in Adam
Smith (1759/1976), and similarly, humans measure their wants and pleasures in relation
to society in Marx (1849), while in Marshall (1961) the emphasis is on the relevance
of human distinction.1 Despite the importance of the question for studying behav-
ior and attitudes, Fischer and Torgler (2006) point to the scant empirical evidence
on it.
Except for adding new empirical evidence to the niche and confirming with causal
results Fischer and Torgler’s (2006) correlation effects on the impact of relative income
position on interpersonal trust, more practically, this paper also contributes to the policy
debate. Policies aimed at increasing equality of opportunities, creating education oppor-
tunities for disadvantaged children and thus increasing upward intergenerational income
mobility could be an alternative to income redistribution. The latter could be seen weak
in preventing the underpriveleged from remaining so in the long run as they fight against
inequality upfronted ex-post, i.e., by taking away from the wealthy to give to the needy.2
Based on the results, I can conclude whether the policy option of increasing income
mobility would be beneficial for trust.
The availability of US General Social Survey (GSS) data which reports respondents’
income, their family income at age 16 along with their current degree of interpersonal
trust makes it feasible to identify how trust is affected by the intergenerational change
in income position experienced by GSS respondents. For that purpose I construct a sim-
ple measure of relative income mobility that equals the difference in income positions
achieved by the son/daughter away from their parents’ income positions.3
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data,
Section 3 presents the econometric specification and the approach for identification.
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Section 4 analyzes the results. Section 5 discusses briefly the policy considerations and
Section 6 concludes.
2 Data
The US GSS is a unique and valuable data source tracking social behavior and attitudes of
Americans since the 1970s.4 It is a rich dataset containing information on demographic
and socio-economic variables, plus records on special topics of interest. In this paper I
use data from the GSS panels 2006, 2008 and 2010, which have the question on “family
income at age 16” along with questions on interpersonal trust, current income and the
necessary control variables for a TRUST regression analysis. The sample includes 1,205
married respondents (See Appendix: Table 4).
Trust is conventionally measured by recording respondents’ answers to the question
“Generally speaking would you say that most people can be trusted/you can’t be too care-
ful in dealing with people?”. The scale includes: 0 if “cannot trust most people”, 1 if the
answer is “depends” and 2 if “can trust most people”.
Past family income is given by respondents’ answer to the question: “Thinking about
the time when you were 16 years old, compared with American families in general then,
would you say your family income was – “far below average”, “below average”, “average”
, “above average”, or “far above average” (See Appendix: Table 5). Current respondent
income is an inflation adjusted personal income equal to total earnings from all sources in
the last year before taxes or other deductions. The variable is within a range of 25 income
brackets (See Appendix: Table 6).
I reduce these 25 income positions for current respondent’s income by aggregating them
to only 5 categories similar to parents’ income: “far below average”, “below average”, “aver-
age”, “above average”, and “far above average.” For two definitions of these five categories,
the modification follows US Census (2010) categorical division for personal income:
first, closely matching the income brackets of the US Census division–constructing
Rincome1 and, secondly, modifying the categories “far below average”, “below average”
and “average” mainly by expanding the percentage for the category “average” to mirror
the corresponging bigger share also for parents’/past family income with the resulting
variable Rincome2. For the third definition of current income, I match the category dis-
tribution of past family income by creating similar in percentage share categories for
respondent’s income–thus, constructing Rincome3 (See Appendix: Table 7). With each of
these simplified measures for current respondent’s income, I obtain the corresponding
indices for income mobility that equal the difference of present individual income posi-
tion and “family income position at age 16” (See Appendix: Table 8). IMindxi for i=1,2 and
3 captures how incomes are correlated across periods: IMindxi = 0 implies intergener-
alational income correlation 1 (i.e., persistence of income), IMindxi > 0 & IMindxi < 0
imply correlation< 1, whereas IMindxi  0 and IMindxi  0 imply correlation 0 (i.e.,
substantial intergenerational income change). IMindxi is an intermediate variable which
I use as a basis for the construction of binary dummies for income mobility but do not
include in the regression analysis.
3 Econometric specification
3.1 Recursive bivariate probit model: selection on unobservables
The empirical challenge for identifying a causal effect of income mobility on trust is to
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deal with the endogeneity of income mobility potentially stemming from selection on
unobservables. That is, unobservables, such as perceptions of the system’s fairness and the
subsequent motivation or optimistic/pessimistic attitudes, could determine the chance to
achieve a change in parents’ income position but could also affect interpersonal trust.
I adopt a structural approach under which the outcome equation for TRUST includes
intergenerational income mobility as an endogenous binary regressor.5 Blundell and
Smith (1993) describe type I and type II specifications of the bivariate probit model. Since
I want to identify the impact of having achieved income mobility on trust rather than
the impact of the propensity to achieve income mobility, the type II specification is the
appropriate one. The coherency conditions for the type II model are fulfilled only when
the model is specified as a recursive system. With the retrospective nature of this study–
the outcome is contemporary trust and the explanatory variable, income mobility, has
been realized prior to reporting trust perceptions–a recursive system highlights that what
is under scrutiny is the causal direction from mobility to trust, and not vice versa. In
that way, it is clear that the endogeneity of intergenerational income mobility stems from
unobservable heterogeneity bias rather than from a direct effect of trust on the chance to
achieve income mobility.
TRUST = x′2iβ2 + μIMI + ε2i (1)
IMI = x′1iβ1 + ε1i (2)
Selection effects are modelled with a common factor specification of the error terms:
ε2i = ρvi + u2i (3)
ε1i = ρvi + u1i (4)
The error terms are distributed as bivariate standard normal [ ε1i, ε2i]∼ 2(0, 0, ρ),
where the first two arguments of 2 are the means of ε1i and ε2i, ρ is the correlation
between ε1i and ε2i, and vi represents unobserved heterogeneity. IMI is an endogenous
explanatory variable if the correlation between ε1i and ε2i is different from zero, i.e., IMI
is endogenous if ρ = 0.
As Jones (2005) explains, the sufficient condition for identification in this recursive sys-
tem is variation in the set of exogenous regressors since identification occurs by functional
form. Although exclusion restrictions are not needed, it is common practice to impose
them for improving identification.
I estimate two versions of the model just presented by changing only the definition of
the binary dummy for income mobility. First, IMI compares any type of income mobility,
captured by IMI = 1 if IMindx = 0, with the absence of income change over genera-
tions, i.e., IMI = 0 based on IMindx = 0. Second, rather than generally representing
income change with IMI, I define two cases for upward and downward income mobility.
For upward mobility IMIU = 1 if IMindx > 0, and IMIU = 0 for persistence of intergen-
erational income positions, i.e., IMindx = 0. Reversely, for downward mobility IMID = 1
if IMindx < 0, and IMID = 0 when IMindx = 0 for lack of mobility. The binary outcome
variable TRUST is the same across the two model versions: TRUST = 1 if TRUST > 0,
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i.e., if “can trust most people,” and TRUST = 0 if the answer is “cannot trust” or “depends.”
The explanatory variables x′1i and x
′




2i, z1i) ⊥ (ε1i, ε2i).
3.2 Exclusion Restrictions
To avoid relying too heavily on the assumption of bivariate normality for identification
by functional form, I incorporate into the analysis a key identifying variable z1i to fulfill
the exclusion restrictions. But even so, the recursive system is a joint model for trust and
income mobility, and not a standard two-step IV approach. The coherency or the logical
consistency of the econometric model remains the main pre-requisite for identification.
Since it is necessary that z1i is correlated with the binary dummies for mobility IMI,
IMIU and IMID, and is also independent from ε2i, I use for it a variable that measures
the difference between respondent’s spouse occupation prestige score and the occupation
prestige score of respondent’s mother (Diffspousemother). For example, according to a
1989 GSS study of occupational prestige classification (Davis et al. 1991), physicians gain
the maximum prestige score while miscellanous food preparation occupations rank the
lowest (See Appendix: Table 11). Predicting income with occupation prestige scores is a
working approach, as demonstrated by several studies (e.g, Ermisch et al. 2006; Feigen-
baum 2014; andMazumder and Acosta 2015). Occupation prestige scores here would also
be proxies for income, so their difference would proxy intergenerational income change.
Correlations of the components of Diffspousemother with income mobility provide pre-
liminary statistical justification for using Diffspousemother as a key identifying variable
(See Appendix: Table 10). In what follows, I discuss how Diffspousemother would satisfy
the exclusion restrictions.
A growing body of research suggests purposeful positive assortative mating in the mar-
riage market. For example, Chadwick and Solon (2002) find evidence for matching with
respect to earnings, Chiappori et al. (2009) show that for 50% of the married couples in
their sample the husband and wife have the same level of schooling, and similarly Ermisch
et al. (2006) evidence assortative mating along human capital. Simple correlation analysis
(See Appendix: Table 9) implies the possible assortative mating characterizing married
respondents in the GSS sample: 46.6% is the correlation between the respondent’s and
the spouse’s highest degrees and 54.7% between the respondent’s and the spouse’s years
of schooling. Likewise, spouse’s occupation prestige score is moderately correlated with
respondent’s occupation prestige score (30.6%), and mother’s occupation prestige score
correlates with father’s occupation prestige score (38.4%). That said, spouse’s occupation
prestige score should make a good predictor of respondent’s current income position,
while mother’s occupation prestige score should proxy father’s income position and, indi-
rectly, the family’s income situation of the respondent at age 16. With valid components,
the variable Diffspousemother becomes a credible predictor of intergenerational income
mobility, in line with the first exclusion restriction.
A challenge in the analysis is the possible dependence of Diffspousemother from the
unobservables included in ε2i, i.e., explanatory factors for TRUST. It is not straightfor-
ward to conclude the contrary, so I discuss the main arguments of controversy. Even
though assigned by an external actor, such as a government agency, occupation pres-
tige scores could reflect perceptions of both the professionals having the scores assigned
and society as an observer of prestige and status. For example, Paxton (2007) finds a
positive effect of occupation prestige score on the predicted probability of generalized
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(interpersonal) trust. Allusive of that finding is Ermisch and Gambetta’s (2011) result
showing that sons’ trustworthiness, even though not exactly trust, is affected positively
by fathers’ occupation prestige score if high. The same question, but studied vice versa, is
also found in Piff et al. (2010), with the hypothesis that “lower class” people (with lower
occupation prestige score) aremore concerned with the needs of others than “upper class”
people, and so will act in a more pro-social manner to improve others’ welfare.
Not excluding the possibility that occupation prestige scores reflect individual differ-
ences in trust, I elaborate on each of the components of the variable Diffspousemother
by explaining the related caveats for dependence with the unobservables shaping trust.
Since I use mother’s occupation prestige score to proxy parents’ income, the first con-
cern is whether transmission of trust-related unobservables from mother to child takes
place. I should acknowledge that the evidence on this is controversial–for example, using
data from a German Socio-Economic Panel Study, Dohmen et al. (2012) find that trust
attitudes are transferred from parents to children. In contrast, relying on a sample of 377
twins, Van Lange et al. (2014) reveal that genetic influences are almost absent from trust
and more modest than that of various expressions of abilities and personality traits. The
authors’ findings challenge the law in behavior genetics according to which all human
behavioral traits are quite heritable. They emphasize that what shapes “trust in others” is
the social interaction experiences outside of the immediate family.
The concern related with the second component of Diffspousemother, spouse’s occu-
pation prestige score, is about possible assortative mating along the dimension of trust.
Indeed, this may happen, as already demonstrated by Dohmen et al. (2012). Nevertheless,
Luo and Klohnen (2005) show positive similarities of married individuals for attitudes
other than trust (e.g, religiosity, political attitudes) with dissimilarities for personal traits
such as extraversion, openness and avoidance. It appears that the personal traits just
mentioned would be related to “trust in others,” and thus depending on the definition
of trust, Dohmen et al.’s (2012) findings could be easily complemented with opposing
results. Moreover, going back to the findings of Van Lange et al. (2014), what matters for
trust is the direct personal experience in social interactions, and even the shared spouses’
environment is not expected to cause similarity in spouses’ generalized trust. Indeed,
genetics could be a factor for partners’ matching (Domingue et al. 2014), but if genes do
not affect generalized trust, then partners could be genetically similar and still dissimilar
in their “trust in others”. Even if some controversy might remain on whether Diffspouse-
mother fulfills fully the exclusion restrictions, referring to Jones (2005), I recall that in the
recursive system identification can be achieved just by functional form.
4 Results
The evidence convincingly demonstrates a causal effect of intergenerational (relative)
income mobility on interpersonal trust. Starting with a general model for income change,
regardless of whether it is upward or downward, the binary dummy IMI is highly signifi-
cant in all model estimations (See Table 1). With an IMindx1-based IMI in column (1), I
obtain a negative sign for the main effect of interest, but this result should be considered
with caution as IMindx1 may not be a realistic measure given that it reflects perfectly the
US Census division of personal income, including a very small share for “average” income.
Varying IMindx1 by extending the percentage share of the “average” personal income,
i.e., using IMindx2-based IMI, I obtain an intuitive positive result from the estimation in
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Table 1 Trust and relative income mobility (upward/downward)
(1) (2) (3)
TRUST=1 if “can trust” MLE coeff ME MLE coeff ME MLE coeff ME
Age ≤ 25 –0.465 –0.170 –0.575* –0.056* –0.430 –0.0623
(–1.62) (–2.09) (–1.58)
25 < Age ≤ 35 –0.342 –0.131 –0.0541 –0.0866 –0.0160 –0.0813
(–1.77) (–0.28) (–0.08)
35 < Age ≤ 45 –0.244 –0.102 0.0751 –0.0601 0.0937 –0.0551
(–1.31) (0.42) (0.52)
45 < Age ≤ 65 0.0331 –0.0039 0.314 0.0071 0.294 0.0086
(0.18) (1.81) (1.70)
IMI –1.244*** –0.364*** 1.475*** 0.306*** 1.432*** 0.289***
(–4.63) (13.64) (14.54)
Black –0.376** –0.136** –0.354* –0.0700* –0.295* –0.0647*
(–2.63) (–2.57) (–2.14)
Female 0.0742 0.0336 –0.0797 0.0098 –0.0730 0.00831
(1.02) (–1.16) (–1.07)
Educ 0.0860*** 0.0311*** 0.0733*** 0.0220*** 0.0803*** 0.0190***
(5.25) (4.48) (5.18)
Res16 0.0104 0.0048 –0.00887 0.0008 0.0059 –0.0019
(0.42) (–0.38) (0.25)
Children –0.121 –0.0441 –0.154 –0.0187 –0.155 –0.0155
(–1.25) (–1.66) (–1.68)
Religious –0.0009 –0.0026 0.0243 0.0059 0.0494 0.0018
(–0.01) (0.25) (0.51)
IMI
Age ≤ 25 –0.188 –0.170 0.430 –0.0562 0.165 –0.0623
(–0.55) (1.33) (0.54)
25 < Age ≤ 35 –0.248 –0.131 –0.320 –0.0866 –0.364 –0.0813
(–1.03) (–1.54) (–1.77)
35 < Age ≤ 45 –0.367 –0.102 –0.325 –0.0601 –0.334 –0.0551
(–1.60) (–1.63) (–1.70)
45 < Age ≤ 65 –0.375 –0.0039 –0.318 0.0071 –0.281 0.00858
(–1.67) (–1.63) (–1.46)
Black 0.0136 –0.136 0.0789 –0.0700 0.00534 –0.0647
(0.09) (0.55) (0.04)
Female 0.172* 0.0336* 0.127 0.0098 0.112 0.0083
(2.11) (1.68) (1.50)
Educ –0.0055 0.0311 0.00409 0.0220 –0.0104 0.0190
(–0.36) (0.29) (–0.75)
Res16 0.0268 0.00480 0.0129 0.0008 –0.0139 –0.0019
(0.96) (0.50) (–0.54)
Children –0.0096 –0.0441 0.0979 –0.0187 0.104 –0.0155
(–0.09) (0.95) (1.02)
Religious –0.0628 –0.0026 –0.0040 0.0059 –0.0466 0.0018
(–0.54) (–0.04) (–0.44)
Diffspousemother –0.0074*** –0.0003*** 0.0026 0.0007 0.0033* 0.0008*
(–3.54) (1.58) (2.07)
ATE –0.434*** 0.497*** 0.504***
N 1205 1205 1205
Wald chi2(22) 261.06 580.02 598.7
LR test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0):
chi2(1) 4.607 2.803 3.959
Prob>chi2 0.0318 0.0941 0.0466
Note: Biprobit fits a maximum-likelihood two-equation probit models of the binary variables TRUST and IMI
ME stands for Marginal Effects; t statistics in parentheses. In estimations (1) through (3) the binary dummy IMI is based on the
differently defined indice IMindx1, IMindx2 and IMindx3. Preferred estimations are printed in bold font
∗p<0.05, ∗∗p<0.01, ∗∗∗p<0.001
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column (2). Moreover, this result gets confirmed by the estimation in column (3), using an
IMindx3-based IMI. The estimated average treatment effect (ATE) is around 0.50 when
the effect of income mobility on trust is positive, implying that trust is increased by 50%
if income mobility is present, relative to a situation in which intergenerational income
positions stay stable. The secondary results on individual-level controls for trust are con-
sistent with previous literature: an additional year of education is related with an increase
in the probability of trust by 2–3%; race, if “black”, correlates negatively with trust; very
young respondents trust less, with the marginal effect (ME) associated with the dummy
Age < 25 equal to –0.05; while females are more trusting (ME = 0.03). The statistical
properties, listed at the bottom of Table 1, confirm the overall satistical significance of
the model for the estimations (1) and (3). The null hypothesis of independent equations
(rho = 0) is rejected with the values for Prob > chi2 less than 0.05, implying that ρ = 0,
and that the bivariate probit model is appropriate.
Intuitively, I expect that positive and negative intergenerational income changes would
affect trust differently, and hence, it is important to distinguish between them. As with
the generally defined income change, IMI, in defining the dummies capturing upward
and downward mobility–IMIup and IMIdown–the baseline case is one of persistence of
parents’ income positions. Compared to the general income mobility model, the sepa-
rate models make it possible to get more precise estimates of intergenerational change
in income influences on trust and subsequently of calculating more accurately the net
causal effect of income mobility. The reason for that is that in comparing more homoge-
nous groups, i.e., only those having experienced either downward or upward mobility
with those with no income mobility, I can eliminate any bias coming from equally treat-
ing downward and upward income movements. Confirming intuition, the estimated ATE
for IMIup is different in sign and size from the ATE for IMIdown (See Tables 2 and 3).
Precisely, reading the robust results from columns (2) and (3), upward income mobility
causes an increase of 35% in the probability of trust (ATE= 0.35) while downward mobil-
ity decreases it by around 30 – 32%. Thus, the resulting net ATE effect is equal to 3–5%.
This result, along with the preliminary indication of a positive causal relationship between
IMI and trust (See Table 1), is essential for conclusions as well as for policy implications.
Consistent with the initial predictions, in the separate model estimations, the probabil-
ity of trust remains lower for black respondents and higher for the more educated (See
Tables 2 and 3). In the sample focusing on “downward incomemovers,” black respondents
appear to have four times lower probablity of trust (ME ≈ 10 − 12%) than black respon-
dents in the sample including the “upward income movers” (ME ≈ 3%). That distinction
does not hold for education as an additional year of education seems to increase the prob-
ability of trust by 1–2% regardless of the type of income mobility experienced. Besides,
age turns out significant only in the estimation for “upward income movers,” suggesting
a 5% increase in the probability of trust with one more year of age. But also, this effect
would be decreasing over time as the squared term for age has a negative significant effect.
Being female positively correlates with downward income change, while the evidence for
gender and upward income change is weaker and inconclusive.
Finally, it is worth commenting whether the initial ambiguity on the sign of the
income mobility effect has been resolved through decomposing positive and negative
income change. For downward mobility, results are robust and convincingly suggest a
negative causal impact. Whereas, for upward income mobility, when using IMIup based
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Table 2 Trust and upward income mobility
(1) (2) (3)
TRUST=1 if “can trust” MLE coeff ME MLE coeff ME MLE coeff ME
Age 0.128*** 0.0566*** 0.0139 0.0114 0.00915 0.0150
(–3.34) (0.46) (0.30)
Agesq –0.00114** –0.0005** –0.0001 –0.0001 –0.0000 –0.0001
(-2.90) (–0.22) (–0.03)
IMIup –1.200*** –0.211*** 1.466*** 0.225*** 1.368*** 0.216***
(–17.17) (7.92) (6.60)
Black –0.387 –0.106 –0.517** –0.0323** –0.455** –0.0377**
(–1.78) (–3.04) (–2.78)
Female –0.0994 –0.0752 0.130 –0.0047 0.0940 –0.0061
(–0.96) (1.55) (1.15)
Educ 0.0864*** 0.0291*** 0.0557* 0.0113* 0.0698*** 0.0125***
(–4.78) (2.40) (3.31)
Res16 0.0405 0.0226 –0.0096 0.0019 0.0240 0.0002
(–1.18) (–0.34) (0.88)
Children –0.0932 –0.0185 –0.106 –0.0137 –0.144 –0.0149
(–0.65) (–0.93) (–1.30)
Religious 0.0072 –0.0169 0.0507 0.0051 0.0629 0.0014
(–0.05) (0.42) (0.54)
IMIup
Age 0.151** 0.0566** 0.0675* 0.0114* 0.0899** 0.0150**
(–3.21) (2.36) (3.21)
Agesq –0.0014** –0.0005** –0.0006* –0.0001* –0.0008** –0.0001**
(–2.95) (–2.02) (–2.87)
Black 0.021 –0.106 0.222 –0.0323 0.145 –0.0377
(–0.09) (1.31) (0.91)
Female –0.239* –0.0752* –0.163 –0.0047 –0.133 –0.0061
(–2.03) (–1.78) (–1.53)
Educ 0.0653** 0.0291** 0.0255 0.0113 0.0130 0.0125
(–3.21) (1.54) (0.84)
Res16 0.0665 0.0226 0.0230 0.0019 –0.0222 0.0002
(–1.71) (0.75) (–0.76)
Children –0.0239 –0.0185 0.0126 –0.0137 0.0479 –0.0149
(–0.15) (0.10) (0.40)
Religious –0.083 –0.0169 –0.0131 0.0051 –0.0534 0.0014
(–0.49) (–0.10) (–0.43)
Diffspousemother –0.0044 –0.0010 0.0036 0.0005 0.0050* 0.0007*
(–1.81) (1.76) (2.40)
ATE –0.184*** 0.356*** 0.349***
N 519 804 873
Wald chi2(18) 333.57 387.34 345.32
LR test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0):
chi2(1) 2.802 2.562 3.938
Prob>chi2 0.0941 0.1095 0.0472
Note: Biprobit fits a maximum-likelihood two-equation probit models of the binary variables TRUST and IMIup
ME stands for Marginal Effects; t statistics in parentheses. In estimations (1) through (3) the binary dummy IMI is based on the
differently defined indice IMindx1, IMindx2 and IMindx3. Preferred estimations are printed in bold font
∗p<0.05, ∗∗p<0.01, ∗∗∗p<0.001
on IMindx1, the negative result is counter-intuitive and inconsistent with the positive
findings based on IMindx2 and IMindx3. An explanation for this estimate is the likely fault
of the income mobility index, IMindx1, to reflect the actual/realistic income distribution
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Table 3 Trust and downward income mobility
(1) (2) (3)
TRUST=1 if “can trust” MLE coeff ME MLE coeff ME MLE coeff ME
Age 0.0238 0.00395 –0.0217 –0.0242 –0.0158 –0.0268
(0.99) (–0.82) (–0.56)
Agesq –0.0001 –0.0000 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003 0.0003
(–0.52) (1.21) (0.99)
IMIdown –1.238*** –0.357*** –1.260*** –0.251*** –1.242*** –0.212***
(–4.77) (–9.12) (–6.67)
Black –0.362* –0.125* –0.268 –0.0769 –0.397* –0.105*
(–2.26) (–1.59) (–2.29)
Female 0.177* 0.0781* 0.239** 0.119** 0.234* 0.128*
(2.10) (2.77) (2.51)
Educ 0.0706*** 0.0224*** 0.0620** 0.0093** 0.0545* –0.0009*
(3.52) (3.02) (2.32)
Res16 0.0287 0.0111 0.0097 0.0021 0.00958 0.0015
(1.04) (0.34) (0.32)
Children –0.211 –0.0731 –0.115 0.0031 –0.134 –0.0023
(–1.96) (–0.98) (–1.13)
Religious –0.0334 –0.0129 –0.0358 –0.0037 –0.0308 –0.0141
(–0.29) (–0.31) (–0.25)
IMIdown
Age –0.0782** 0.0039** –0.111*** –0.0242*** –0.112*** –0.0268***
(–3.21) (–4.98) (–5.00)
Agesq 0.0008** –0.0000** 0.0012*** 0.0003*** 0.0012*** 0.0003***
(3.10) (4.96) (5.10)
Black –0.0098 –0.125 –0.100 –0.0769 –0.203 –0.105
(–0.06) (–0.56) (–1.10)
Female 0.319*** 0.0781*** 0.387*** 0.119*** 0.426*** 0.128***
(3.63) (4.35) (4.60)
Educ –0.0354* 0.0224* –0.0229 0.0093 –0.0448* –0.0009*
(–2.11) (–1.35) (–2.49)
Res16 0.0214 0.0111 0.0003 0.0021 –0.0004 0.0015
(0.70) (0.01) (–0.01)
Children –0.0229 –0.0731 0.121 0.0031 0.0726 –0.0023
(–0.19) (1.02) (0.60)
Religious –0.0251 –0.0129 0.0206 –0.0037 –0.0421 –0.0141
(–0.19) (0.16) (–0.32)
Diffspousemother –0.0085*** –0.0004*** –0.0043* –0.0008* –0.0047* –0.0010*
(–3.74) (–2.25) (–2.27)
ATE –0.353*** –0.296*** –0.318***
N 953 844 807
Wald chi2(18) 257.99 431.67 358.23
LR test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0):
chi2(1) 5.698 4.605 4.371
Prob>chi2 0.0170 0.0319 0.0366
Note: Biprobit fits a maximum-likelihood two-equation probit models of the binary variables TRUST and IMIdown
ME stands for Marginal Effects; t statistics in parentheses. In estimations (1) through (3) the binary dummy IMI is based on the
differently defined indice IMindx1, IMindx2 and IMindx3. Preferred estimations are printed in bold font
∗p<0.05, ∗∗p<0.01, ∗∗∗p<0.001
of GSS respondents. Observing the significance of the identifying variable Diffspouse-
mother only in the estimation with IMindx3-based IMIup helps in highlighting as more
credible the positive IMIup effect. Moreover, among the three estimations on IMIup, in
accordance with the Likelihood ratio test, the overall significance of the model is best
captured by the IMindx3-based estimation.
In relation to the cited theories on relative economic status in Fischer and Torgler
(2006), the current evidence suggests the implicit linkage between generalized trust
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and perceptions of fairness through income mobility. Low current income position, or
downward income mobility, and the expected, but unobserved, perceptions of others’
unfairness would explain low generalized trust, while high income position, or upward
income mobility, and positive perceptions of others would explain high generalized trust.
5 Policy Implications
Increasing income mobility, as defined here in relative terms, would entail a change in the
percentage shares of both up and down income “movers,” i.e., there will be winners and
losers. Overall, however, social trust will be favorably affected if there is more intergener-
ational income volatility rather than if income positions were passed down from parents
to children. The identified causality could be interpreted in terms of unobserved system’s
fairness and the perceptions arising from it. An environment that encourages education
and equal opportunities would be conducive for trust through actual income mobility,
among other possible channels. Regarding social trust, these results connect with exist-
ing evidence on the effects of education and social homogeneity while implicitly also
suggesting equality of opportunity as another source of homogeneity for trust.
6 Conclusions
The evidence on income inequality and relative economic status on behavior and attitudes
is still rare. Another way to study income inequality is to think about intergenerational
income mobility. The way income mobility affects generalized trust could be quite infor-
mative for understanding the general impact of income mobility on the economy. The
contribution of the paper is two-fold: first, it provides evidence for a causal relationship
between the relative/intergenerational change in income positions and trust, and sec-
ond, it makes it possible to consider income mobility policies as a feasible alternative to
income redistribution. Results suggest that trust is affected positively when children have
achieved an upward movement from their parents’ income position, while it is decreased
by the experience of downward income mobility. The majority of the findings are robust
to a change of the definition of the incomemobility measure. With a resulting positive net
effect of income mobility, the paper recommends policies aimed at equality of opportuni-
ties and education. Further research could check the validity of these results with absolute
income mobility measures and, if possible, also extend it beyond the US case.
Endnotes
1Adam Smith (1759/1976), Marx (1849) and Marshall (1961) are cited in Fischer and
Torgler (2006).
2Thurow’s (1973) reasons for inefficient and ineffective income redistribution are:
insufficiently distinguished means and ends, difficulty to come up with a consistent deci-
sion on the alteration of the income distribution, inevitable infringement of property
rights and internal policy contradictions. Prompted by the need to explain the puzzle
of inefficient redistribution, Acemoglu and Robinson (2001) develop a theory model in
which inefficient redistribution could be a tool to sustain political power.
3Previous studies have focused on inter-generational father-son or father-daughter
correlation of earnings (Solon 1992; Chadwick and Solon 2002).
4 GSS data is referenced as Smith et al. (2013).
5The model specification follows the description of a recursive biprobit model in
Jones (2005).
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Appendix
Table 4 Summary statistics
Variable N Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
TRUST 1,205 0.46 0.499 0 1
= 0 if “cannot trust” or “depends” 651
= 1 if “can trust” 554
Age ≤ 25 1,205 0.028 0.166 0 1
25 < Age ≤ 35 1,205 0.195 0.396 0 1
35 < Age ≤ 45 1,205 0.284 0.451 0 1
45 < Age ≤ 65 1,205 0.452 0.498 0 1
Age > 65 1,205 0.0407 0.197 0 1
Age 1,205 45.468 11.694 19 88
Black 1,205 0.074 0.262 0 1
= 0 if “white” or “other” 1,116
= 1 if “black” 89
Female 1,205 0.504 0.5 0 1
= 0 if “male” 598
= 1 if “female” 607
Educ (years of education) 1,205 14.524 2.741 2 20
Res16 1,205 3.466 1.456 1 6
= 1 if “country,nonfarm” 152
= 2 if “farm” 100
= 3 if “town lt 50000” 425
= 4 if “50000 to 250000” 222
= 5 if “big-city suburb” 174
= 6 if “city gt 250000” 132
Children 1,205 0.829 0.377 0 1
= 0 if “no children” 206
= 1 if “children” 999
Religious 1,205 0.856 0.352 0 1
= 0 if “not religious” 174
= 1 if “religious” 1,031
Spouse prestige score 1,205 46.753 13.458 17 86
Mother prestige score 1,205 43.183 14.309 17 86
Diffspousemother 1,205 3.569 17.686 –54 55
Table 5 Categories of family income at age 16
Fincome (age 16) categories Frequency %
= 1 “Far Below Average” 81 6.72
= 2 “Below Average” 257 21.33
= 3 “Average” 587 48.71
= 4 “Above Average” 270 22.41
= 5 “Far Above Average” 10 0.83
Total N = 1,205 100
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Table 6 Respondents’ income (Rincome) as of survey year (2006, 2008 & 2010)
under 1 000 17 1.41
1 000 to 2 999 21 1.74
3 000 to 3 999 12 1
4 000 to 4 999 16 1.33
5 000 to 5 999 16 1.33
6 000 to 6 999 9 0.75
7 000 to 7 999 8 0.66
8 000 to 9 999 26 2.16
10000 to 12499 52 4.32
12500 to 14999 32 2.66
15000 to 17499 27 2.24
17500 to 19999 26 2.16
20000 to 22499 51 4.23
22500 to 24999 42 3.49
25000 to 29999 67 5.56
30000 to 34999 97 8.05
35000 to 39999 93 7.72
40000 to 49999 154 12.78
50000 to 59999 112 9.29
60000 to 74999 108 8.96
75000 to 89999 83 6.89
90000 to 109999 53 4.4
110000 to 129999 39 3.24
130000 to 149999 12 1
150000 or over 32 2.66











Table 7 Respondent’s income (Rincome) variables
Rincome Rincome1 ≈ US Census Rincome2(Cat 1,2 & 3 = US Census) Rincome3 ≈ % Fincome
= 1 “Far Below Average” 29.46 % Rincome ≤ 24999 6.8 % Rincome ≤ 5999 5.48 % ≈ 6.72 %
= 2 “Below Average” 34.11 % 25000 > Rincome ≤ 49999 22.66 % 6000 > Rincome ≤ 24999 20.5 % ≈ 21.33 %
= 3 “Average” 18.26 % 50000 > Rincome ≤ 74999 52.37 % 25000 > Rincome ≤ 74999 46.89 % ≈ 48.71 %
= 4 “Above Average” 11.29 % 75000 > Rincome ≤ 109999 11.29 % 75000 > Rincome ≤ 109999 24.48 % ≈ 22.41 %
= 5 “Far Above Average” 6.89 % 110000 > Rincome 6.89 % 110000 > Rincome 2.66 % ≈ 0.83 %
Cat 1,2 & 3 refer to the shares of respondents falling in categories “Far Below Average”, “Below Average” & “Average”
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Table 8 Descriptives of IMI measures
Rincome categories IMindx1 IMindx2 IMindx3
Frequency % Frequency % Frequency %
= –4 5 0.41 1 0.08 1 0.08
= –3 55 4.56 19 1.58 15 1.24
= –2 259 21.49 74 6.14 68 5.64
= –1 367 30.46 307 25.48 248 20.58
= 0 267 22.16 443 36.76 475 39.42
= 1 152 12.61 240 19.92 279 23.15
= 2 76 6.31 97 8.05 94 7.80
= 3 20 1.66 20 1.66 25 2.07
= 4 4 0.33 4 0.33 . .
Total N = 1,205 100 N = 1,205 100 N = 1,205
IMI
0 if IMindx = 0 267 22.16 443 36.76 475 39.42
1 if IMindx = 0 938 77.84 762 63.24 730 60.58
Total N = 1,205 100 N = 1,205 100 N = 1,205 100
IMIup
0 if IMindx = 0 267 51.45 443 55.10 475 54.41
1 if IMindx > 0 252 48.55 361 44.90 398 45.59
Total N = 519 100 N = 804 100 N = 873 100
IMIdown
0 if IMindx = 0 267 28.02 443 52.49 475 58.86
1 if IMindx < 0 686 71.98 401 47.51 332 41.14
Total N = 953 100 N = 844 100 N = 807 100
Note: IMindxi = Rincomei − Fincome where i = 1,2 and 3
Table 9 Evidence for positive assortative mating
Correlations (N)
Education
Respondent and spouse’s degrees (highest) 0.4667 (1,203)
Respondent and spouse’s years of school 0.5476 (1,200)
Job prestige scores
Respondent and spouse 0.3066 (1205)
Mother and father 0.3841 (1205)
Table 10 Diffspousemother: predicting income mobility
Correlations (N)
Spouse’s job prestige score and Rincome 0.1907 (1205)
Mother’s job prestige score and Fincome 0.2458 (1205)
Diffspousemother and IMI –0.0827 (1205)
Diffspousemother and respondent’s job prestige score 0.0507 (1205)
Mother’s and respondent’s job prestige scores 0.2257 (1205)
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Table 11 Ocuppations & prestige scores
1980 Census occupational category 1980 Census code 1989 GSS prestige score
Miscellaneous Food Preparation Occupations 444 17 (min)
Legislators 3 61
Chief Executives and General Admin., Public Admin. 4 70
Administrators and Officials, Public Administration 5 51
Administrators, Protective Service 6 54
Financial Managers 7 59
Personnel and Labor Relations Managers 8 54
Purchasing Managers 9 63
Managers, Marketing, Advertising, and Public Relations 13 59
Administrators, Education and Related Fields 14 64
Managers, Medicine and Health 15 69
Managers, Properties and Real Estate 16 39
Postmasters and Mail Superintendents 17 53
Funeral Directors 18 49
Managers and Administrators, n.e.c. 19 51
Accountants and Auditors 23 65
Underwriters 24 48
Other Financial Officers 25 48
Management Analysts 26 61
Personnel, Training, and Labor Relations Specialists 27 43
Purchasing Agents and Buyers, Farm Products 28 42
Business and Promotion Agents 34 51
Construction Inspectors 35 47
Inspectors/Compliance Officers, Except Construction 36 50
Management Related Occupations, n.e.c. 37 49
Architects 43 73
Aerospace Engineers 44 72
Economics Teachers 119 74
Physicians 84 86 (max)
Note: This is an extract from the 1989 GSS occupational prestige rating at: http://publicdata.norc.org:41000/gss/documents/
BOOK/GSS_Codebook.pdf, Appendix F
Competing interests
The IZA Journal of Labor and Development is committed to the IZA Guiding Principles of Research Integrity. The author
declares that she has observed these principles.
Acknowledgements
The author is grateful to her supervisor, Fidel Perez, Department of Economic Analysis, University of Alicante, for his
patient guidance, encouragement and helpful advice. She would also like to thank for feedback on a previous version to
Elena Martinez Sanchis, David Cuberes, Asier Mariscal, Juan Mora, Pedro Albarran and Lola Collado. She would also like to
acknowledge useful feedback from Kirill Borissov at the XV Conference on International Economics and from several
anonymous referees. Funding from the Department of Economic Analysis, University of Alicante, and from the European
Commission, Joint Research Centre (JRC), is gratefully acknowledged.
Responsible editor: Hartmut Lehmann
Received: 9 April 2015 Accepted: 11 August 2015
References
Aaberge R, Bjorklund A, Jantti M, Palme M, Pedersen PJ, Smith N, Wennemo T (2002) Income inequality and income
mobility in the scandinavian countries compared to the United States. Rev Income Wealth 48:443–469
Acemoglu D, Robinson JA (2001) A theory of political transitions. Am Polit Sci Rev 95(3):649–661. Sept. 2011
Aghion P, Algan Y, Cahuc P, Shleifer A (2010) Regulation and distrust. Q J Econ, MIT Press 125(3):1015–1049
Alesina A, La Ferrara E (2002) Who trusts others? J Public Econ 85:207–234
Algan Y, Cahuc P (2010) Inherited trust and growth. Am Econ Rev 100:2060–92
Arrow KJ (1974) The Limits of organization (1st edn), Norton, New York
Shaleva IZA Journal of Labor & Development  (2015) 4:15 Page 17 of 17
Blundell RW, Smith RJ (1993) Simultaneous microeconometric models with censored or qualitative dependent variables.
In: Maddala GS, Rao CR, Vinoc HD (eds). Handbook of Statistics, Vol. II. Elsevier, Amsterdam
Chadwick L, Solon G (2002) Intergenerational income mobility among daughters. Am Econ Rev 92(1):335–344
Chiappori P-A, Iyigun M, Weiss Y (2009) Investment in schooling and the marriage market. Am Econ Rev 99(5):1689–1713
Davis JA, Smith TW, Hodge RW, Nakao K, Treas J (1991) Occupational prestige ratings from the 1989 general social survey.
Chicago, IL: National Opinion Research Center [producer], 1991. Ann Arbor, MI: Inter-university Consortium for
Political and Social Research [distributor]. http://doi.org/10.3886/ICPSR09593.v1
Dohmen T, Falk A, Huffman D, Sunde U (2012) The intergenerational transmission of risk and trust attitudes. Rev Econ
Stud 79:645–677
Domingue B, Fletcher J, Conleye D, Boardman JD (2014) Genetic and educational assortative mating among US adults.
Proc Natl Acad Sci 111(22):7996–8000
Ermisch J, Gambetta D (2011) The long shadow of income on trustworthiness. Sociol Work Pap 3:1–35
Ermisch J, Francesconi M, Siedler T (2006) Intergenerational economic mobility and assortative mating. Econ J
116:659–679
Feigenbaum JJ (2014) A new old measure of intergenerational mobility: Iowa 1915 to 1940. http://scholar.harvard.edu/
files/jfeigenbaum/files/feigenbaum_-_intergenerational_mobility_-_10-21-14.pdf
Fischer J, Torgler B (2006) The effect of relative Income position on social capital. Econ Bull 26(4):1–20
Freeman R-B, Katz L-F (1995) Introduction and summary, in differences and changes in wage structures. Richard, B.
Freeman and Lawrence F. Katz, eds. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 1–22. Cited in Solon, G (2002),
Cross-Country Differences in Intergenerational Earnings Mobility. The Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 16, No. 3,
pp 59–66
Gottschalk P (1997) Inequality, income growth, and mobility: the basic facts. J Econ Perspect 11(2):21–40
Gottschalk P, Smeeding T-M (1997) Cross-national comparisons of earnings and income inequality. J Eco Lit 35: 2,
pp 633–87. Cited in Solon, G. (2002), Cross-Country Differences in Intergenerational Earnings Mobility. The Journal of
Economic Perspectives, Vol. 16, No. 3, pp. 59–66
Jones A (2005) Applied econometrics for health economists. A Practical Guide. Prepared for the Office of Health
Economics 2005
La Porta R, Lopez-de-Silanes F, Shleifer A, Vishny R (1997) Trust in large organizations. Am Econ Rev, Am Econ Assoc
87(2):333–38
Luo SH, Klohnen EC (2005) Assortative mating and marital quality in newlyweds: a couple-centered approach. J Pers Soc
Psychol 88:304–326
Marshall A (1961) Principles of economics, London: Macmillan. Cited in Fischer J. and B. Torgler (2006), The Effect of
Relative Income Position on Social Capital. Econ Bull 26(4):1–20
Marx K (1849) Wage labour and capital in selected works, Vol.1, by K. Marx and F. Engels, Moscow: Progress Publishers.
Cited in Fischer J. and B. Torgler (2006), The Effect of Relative Income Position on Social Capital. Econ Bull 26(4):1–20
Mazumder B, Acosta M (2015) Using occupation to measure intergenerational mobility. ANNALS Am Acad Polit Soc Sci
657(1):174–193
Millo G, Pasini G (2010) Does social capital reduce moral hazard? A network model for non-Life insurance demand. Fisc
Stud, Inst Fisc Stud 31(3):341–372. 09
Paxton P (2007) Association memberships and generalized trust: a multilevel model across 31 countries. Soc Forces
86(1):47–76
Piff P-K, Kraus M-W, Cheng B-H, Keltner D (2010) Having less, giving more: the influence of social class on prosocial
behavior. J Pers Soc Psychol 99(5):771–784
Putnam R (1993) Making democracy, work: civic traditions in Modern Italy. Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ
Solon G (1992) Intergenerational Income Mobility in the United States. Am Econ Rev, Publ Am Econ Assoc 82(3):393–408
Solon, G (2002) Cross-country differences in intergenerational earnings mobility. J Econ Perspect 16(3):59–66
Smith A (1759/1976) Theory of moral sentiments, Oxford: Clarendon Press. Cited in Fischer J. and B. Torgler (2006), The
Effect of Relative Income Position on Social Capital. Econ Bull 26(4):1–20
Smith T-W, Marsden P, Hout M, Kim J (2013) General social surveys, 1972–2012 [machine-readable data file] /Principal
Investigator, Tom W. Smith; Co-Principal Investigator, Peter V. Marsden; Co-Principal Investigator, Michael Hout;
Sponsored by National Science Foundation. –NORC ed.– Chicago: National Opinion Research Center [producer];
Storrs, CT: The Roper Center for Public Opinion Research, University of Connecticut [distributor],
Stiglitz J (2000) Formal and informal institutions. In: Dasgupta P, Serageldin I (eds). Social Capital: A Multifaceted
Perspective. World Bank, Washington, DC
Thurow L (1973) The political economy of income redistribution policies. ANNALS Am Acad Polit Soc Sci 409:146–155
Van Lange P, Vinkhuyzen A, Posthuma D (2014) Genetic influences are virtually absent for trust. PLoS ONE 9(4):e93880
Zak P, Knack S (2001) Trust and growth. Econ J, R Econ Soc 111(470):295–321
Zak, P, Knack S (2002) Building trust: public policy, interpersonal trust, and economic development. Supreme Court Econ
Rev 10:91–107
